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Many academic studies in International Business empirically test the determinants of 
Chinese outward (O)FDI. A weakness with these studies is the limited critical evaluation 
given to the way in which Chinese OFDI data is collected and employed. Chinese 
(C)MNEs frequently establish special purpose entities in tax havens to transit FDI via 
intermediary jurisdictions. The purpose of this paper is to develop an alternative approach 
for measuring CMNE OFDI and subsequently explore how the results of previous studies 
may have been confounded by the use of tax havens by MNEs. We address the latter 
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Chinese multinational enterprises (CMNEs) are growing in importance on the international 
stage as outward foreign direct investors (UNCTAD 2017). This has precipitated a rapid 
increase in the research on CMNEs. To date, dozens of academic studies on the strategies and 
behaviors of Chinese outward (O)FDI have been published in respected journals (Alon et al. 
2018). Topical research themes that have emerged include debate over whether conventional 
models of the MNE, developed predominantly on the Western now developed market 
experience, are applicable to CMNEs (Child and Rodrigues 2005; Hertenstein et al. 2015; Luo 
and Tung 2007; Mathews 2006; Sutherland et al. 2017; Sutherland, Anderson, and Hu 2020). 
As a result, a large body of influential empirical work has been undertaken. Many of these 
studies employ statistical methods and comparatively large data sets to explore these new 
conceptual issues. Officially published FDI data, in particular, is the a commonly used data 
source employed in the empirical testing of CMNE outward (O)FDI strategy and behavior. To 
make sense of Chinese OFDI data, however, appreciation of the specific institutional context 
from which CMNEs have emerged and the strategies and behaviors this has fostered is required. 
In particular, for many years Chinese businesses faced strong incentives to move their activities 
offshore, so as to recreate themselves as foreign MNEs. Domestic subsidiaries in China would 
be owned by a foreign holding company – effectively making them foreign invested enterprises. 
They did this to avail lower corporate tax rates offered to attract the inward FDI of foreign 
MNEs, as well as to benefit from superior offshore institutions, such as international capital 
markets and strong legal institutions (Buckley et al. 2015). As a result, a considerable share of 
officially recorded Chinese OFDI shows investments to tax havens to be significant. The 
investment in these jurisdictions, however, only captures capital injections to offshore special 
purpose entities, such as investment holding companies. It cannot be thought of as “real” 
investments in any meaningful sense. More worryingly, further genuine investments 
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undertaken from these offshore shell companies are typically not recorded in official FDI data, 
which only accounts for the initial country of investment, as it is collected only on a bilateral 
basis. Official FDI data, as a result, suffers from a number of geographical and volume biases 
(Sutherland and Anderson 2015). These data issues have led to potentially misguided findings 
and conclusions regarding the activities and strategies of CMNEs, in turn misleading CMNE 
related theorization.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Past studies in International Business tend to 
underestimate, or otherwise ignore, the complexities of measuring CMNE cross-border 
investment activities. Without an appreciation for the context from which CMNEs emerge, it 
is difficult to meaningfully test whether CMNEs conform, or not, to extant theories. Our first 
objective, therefore, is to propose a contextually appropriate methodological approach for 
empirically testing the determinants of Chinese OFDI. We do so by outlining an alternative 
methodology for measuring CMNE activity that does not rely upon official Chinese FDI data. 
Second, we seek to understand how the extensive use of official FDI data may have led to 
erroneous conclusions regarding CMNE strategy and international expansion. To achieve these 
goals, we replicate four empirical studies on CMNE OFDI but do so using firm-level data 
sources which overcome some of the problems inherent in the use of official data.  
By way of conclusion we argue, owing to the idiosyncratic investment strategies of CMNEs, 
many influential empirical studies on CMNE OFDI suffer from serious methodological 
shortcomings related to their injudicious use of FDI data. Specifically, we find that the impacts 
of cultural proximity, geographic distance and natural resource endowment all act differently 
to that currently supposed. At a conceptual level, we question the basis on which past studies 
have advanced new conceptual understandings of CMNEs. In doing so, we highlight the serious 
challenges involved in measuring MNE activity in an era characterized by the prominent use 
of shell companies established in tax havens for the structuring of FDI (OECD, 2015). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Issues Measuring Genuine FDI Activity 
FDI takes place across geographically dispersed locations via myriad different investment 
structures including shell or dummy companies, or what Beugelsdijk et al. (2010) refer to as 
offshore special purpose entities (SPE). SPEs are ‘firms that have no economic activity except 
for a part-time accountant or lawyer’ (Contractor 2016, p. 10). SPEs have been used since the 
1970’s for purposes such as accessing capital at favorable interest rates and diversifying 
financial risk (Soroosh and Ciesielski 2004). SPEs have more recently been used by companies 
such as the now defunct Enron to, ‘minimize financial-statement losses and volatility, 
accelerate profits, and avoid adding debt to its balance sheet’ (Schwarcz 2006, p. 1309). The 
OECD states that ‘the role of these SPEs is merely to serve as a financial turn table for 
enterprises in other countries…[and] hardly affect domestic economic activity and do not 
reflect genuine investment activities in or of the reporting country itself” (OECD 2008, p. 186).  
While the difficulty of measuring genuine FDI activity has been highlighted in past studies 
(Beugelsdijk et al. 2010), compilers of FDI statistics such as the World Bank, OECD, and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) generally still report only the first destination of foreign 
investment. This is to say, FDI is generally recorded on an immediate bilateral basis. This is 
because FDI data was originally compiled for calculating capital account balance of payments 
positions (IMF 1993). The global ultimate ownership (GUO) of investments, therefore, was 
not taken into account. GUO data, however, is more appropriate when trying to understand 
genuine MNE activity. This is because it accounts for the use of tax havens by crediting the 
ultimate owners of the investment in the final host destination. In this way, offshore 
intermediate host destinations used chiefly as transition points for capital transfer are 
disregarded. Due to the pervasive use of tax havens and SPEs, official data may introduce 
significant biases into location choice econometric modeling results (Jones and Temouri 2016). 
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Recent estimates indicate a significant amount of global FDI stocks reside in OECD recognized 
tax havens and offshore financial centers (Haberly and Wójcik 2015a; UNCTAD 2015). 
Contractor (2016), for example, ‘conservatively estimate that 30-40% of all FDI affiliates 
worldwide in the UNCTAD World Development Reports or World Bank databases are shell 
companies’ (p. 12). Others estimate ‘approximately 30-50 percent of global FDI is accounted 
for by networks of offshore shell companies created by corporations and individuals for tax 
and other purposes’ (Haberly and Wójcik 2015a, p. 251). Contractor (2016) continues to argue 
that Chinese MNEs account for the most serious FDI distortions of any major economy. This 
is not to say, however, that other nations do not suffer from similar FDI distortions. Of all the 
FDI into the Netherlands, for example, 80% are routed through a shell company (UNCTAD 
2015). American companies are reported to have between 2-3 trillion dollars stored in shell 
companies located in tax havens across the world for the purpose of, for example, future 
international expansion (i.e. genuine FDI) (Contractor 2016). Other large emerging markets 
are also impacted by the use of shell companies and tax havens. India, for example, receives 
nearly one-third of its FDI from Mauritius, much of which is originally OFDI from Indian 
MNEs (Contractor 2016; UNCTAD 2015). 
The lack of astute attention to the impact of FDI routed through tax havens in Chinese OFDI 
location choice studies is puzzling as CMNEs have followed more extreme paths than most 
MNEs in their use of havens (Sutherland and Anderson 2015). Since the early 2000’s, China’s 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has aligned its FDI statistical reporting with 
internationally established balance-of-payment guidelines, such as those from the OECD, IMF, 
and World Bank (Cheng and Ma 2007). Tax havens have unfailingly figured prominently as 
major recipients of China’s officially compiled OFDI.  
The two main roles tax havens play for CMNEs are “round-tripping” and “onward-journeying” 
FDI. Round-tripping takes place when a CMNE invests in a tax haven only to immediately 
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route the FDI back to China (Tseng and Zebregs 2002). This is a common tactic used by 
CMNEs wishing to be treated as a foreign-invested company in China in order to secure tax 
breaks, subsidized land, or other perks given only to non-domestic firms (Hong and Sun 2006). 
While incentives for round-tripping have been reduced in recent years, official data is still 
severely confounded by this trend.  
Onward-journeying takes place when firms use tax havens as conduits for investment in third 
countries  (Clegg and Voss 2011; Sutherland and Ning 2011). This is also referred to as capital 
in transit (OECD, 2015). According to officially recorded FDI statistics, the investment from 
China to the tax haven is recorded as genuine FDI. However, ‘Investments made via SPEs to 
third countries…are not recorded at all in official Chinese OFDI data (following current OECD 
guidelines)’ (Sutherland and Anderson 2015, p. 5). The triad of Hong Kong, British Virgin 
Islands and Cayman Islands are the most prominent tax haven destinations for both round 
tripping and onward journeying Chinese OFDI (Haberly and Wójcik 2015a; Sutherland et al. 
2019; Sutherland and Anderson 2015; Vlcek 2010). 
The active routing of FDI through tax havens for round-tripping and onward journeying is 
highly problematic to understanding CMNE activities. UNCTAD, for example, recently 
reported that nearly half of all foreign invested subsidiaries worldwide are Chinese (434,248 
out of a total of 892,114). If counting only genuine, value-added FDI this is highly improbable 
(Contractor 2016). The country-specific statistics on Chinese OFDI bore out the significance 
of tax haven use. Between 2003 and 2017 on average around 73% of officially recorded OFDI 
flows from China were destined for tax havens (MOFCOM 2018; 2006). If FDI from China to 
tax havens and offshore financial centers (hereafter THOFC) is disregarded, studies will be 
estimating results based on a very small subsample of observations which may not be 
representative of actual CMNE FDI behavior. Some studies do, however, use this approach (i.e. 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). If FDI from China to THOFC is included in location choice modelling, 
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the most salient features of the most prominent THOFCs are likely to seriously skew the 
modeling results. 
In sum, it is clear China is not alone in its use of tax havens. China is, however, by far the most 
aggressive user of tax havens as a conduit for FDI among major economies (Contractor, 2012). 
It is therefore surprising to find the majority of location choice studies on Chinese OFDI use 
official FDI statistics aggregated at the country level. This leads to a significant overestimation 
of genuine FDI to tax havens in the case of initial investment and a significant underestimation 
of genuine FDI to final host economies. These counteracting forces may significantly skew 
econometric modeling results if not handled properly. 
Exploring CMNE OFDI Behavior Accounting for Tax Haven and Offshore Financial 
Center Use 
Given the geographical and volume biases inherent in official Chinese OFDI data, care must 
be taken when using both aggregate and firm-level FDI data as an indicator of the genuine FDI 
activities of MNEs (Beugelsdijk et al. 2010; OECD 2008). China’s MOFCOM data does not, 
therefore, appear to be a promising source for investigating Chinese MNE activity. To date, 
however, many empirical studies have looked at the country location determinants of Chinese 
OFDI using this aggregated official OFDI data source (Table 1). Surprisingly, many of the 
studies in Table 1 do not address the SPE issue. Huang and Wang (2011), for example, include 
tax havens (such as the Bahamas and Luxembourg). This is troubling as MOFCOM data reports 
around 30% of all Chinese FDI into Europe takes place in Luxembourg (Blomkvist and 
Drogendijk 2016). When accounting for global ultimate ownership, however, this drops to 
0.1%. Zhang and Daly (2011) include a number of offshore subsidiaries. Armstrong (2011) 
acknowledges the SPE problem but simply ignores the biases introduced ‘as there are no more 
reliable sources’ (p. 28).  The rest, with few exceptions, include Chinese OFDI to Hong Kong 
whilst excluding other THOFCs. This, however, is also highly problematic. Hong Kong is a 
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major offshore financial center and tax haven and, as a result, an important location for Chinese 
SPE creation (Buckley et al. 2015). Further troubling are Chinese firms which choose to un-
incorporate in China only to incorporate in a THOFC and subsequently create wholly owned 
subsidiaries in China and elsewhere. In this case, nothing changes from a headquarters, 
production, or distribution perspective. Only corporate structure (on paper) changes. Unless 
FDI is undertaken by a “subsidiary” in China to a third country, which is rare, these investments 
are also lost in officially collected FDI statistics. The issue of SPE use in THOFCs, therefore, 
affects all cross-country studies that use official national level OFDI data. A recent study by 
Sutherland et al. (2019), moreover, also shows that the implications for empirical studies using 
firm-level data are also very serious if the SPE problem is not fully addressed. They directly 
assess papers on Chinese OFDI recently published in Journal of International Business Studies 
(JIBS) and find serious problems in the handling of SPEs in most JIBS publications over the 
past decade. Subsidiaries in countries like the Netherlands, they show, are consistently but 
incorrectly included in firm-level empirical studies. They cite recent OECD data showing 
around 19 of the 20 billion US dollars of Chinese FDI to the Netherlands is SPE related. 
******* Table 1 about here ******* 
Data collection accounting for Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) 
As noted, FDI data collected at a national level was originally compiled mainly for balance of 
payments purposes. As such, bilateral flows of capital are what FDI data focuses upon. It is 
thus the immediate country (source and destination) which is important and recorded in FDI 
data (Beugelsdijk et al. 2010). Commercial firm-level databases, however, such as Thomson 
One and the Financial Times fDi Markets database, were specifically created to understand 
firm-level investment behavior (not macro-level international balance of payments positions). 
In such databases the GUO refers to the ultimate beneficial owner of an investment. In many 
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commercial datasets, the investing company as well as its GUO (i.e. parent firm) are both 
available. If, for example, a Chinese company invests in the United States through its subsidiary 
in the Cayman Islands, commercial data would state the name and location of both the Cayman 
Islands company as well as the Chinese GUO. Using the GUO data alleviates onward 
journeying concerns by capturing genuine FDI flows. Using GUO data also facilitates the 
removal of round-tripping FDI. In the previous example, official data sources, such as 
MOFCOM and UNCTAD, would record the investment as coming from China and going to 
the Cayman Islands. Using GUO data, therefore, meaningfully controls for both onward 
journeying and round tripping investments made by CMNEs.  
Organizations which incorporate parent firms in THOFCs are more difficult to disentangle than 
firms engaging in onward journeying or round tripping FDI. In this case, it is important to 
cross-reference home country global headquarters and home country incorporation. If 
headquarters are located outside the country of incorporation, these companies should be 
flagged and checked manually. When firms are incorporated in THOFCs with little to no value-
added activity taking place in that country, FDI is seen to originate from the global headquarters 
home country. If multiple headquarters are reported, control is derived by looking at the 
physical locations of the board of directors, CEOs, or other individuals who control significant 
portions of the operation of the firm. In this way, with a few additional steps, GUO is able to 
be meaningfully derived from commercial data sources. Due to the level of data aggregation, 
uncovering GUO is not possible for officially reported FDI statistics. 
Past studies have recorded the pervasive use THOFCs by Chinese companies, such as China 
Mobile (Wójcik and Camilleri 2015). Shunfeng International Clean Energy Limited (SFCE) is 
another classic example of a Chinese organization which has incorporated in a THOFC. SFCE 
is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, but is headquartered in China and the vast majority of 
its board of directors are Chinese nationals. The primary business of SFCE is the production 
 9 
of solar panels – none of which are designed, produced, or distributed in the Cayman Islands. 
SFCE has three main branches: trading; holding company; and investment. By far the largest 
value-adding entity of these is the holding company. This holding company is incorporated in 
the Cayman Islands, but the vast majority of its factories are located in China – places such as 
Jiangsu, Qinghai, Wuxi, Jiangxi, Shanghai, and others. See Figure 1.  
******* Figure 1 about here ******* 
Many of the first-level parents (i.e. not ultimate parent) of these factories are also incorporated 
in THOFCs. Take the SFCE entity Wuxi Suntech Power as example. It is headquartered in 
Wuxi, China but incorporated in the Cayman Islands as Suntech Power Holdings. This entity 
has 100% ownership over Power Solar Systems, which is incorporated in the British Virgin 
Islands. Power Solar Systems owns 100% of Wuxi Suntech Power which is incorporated in 
China and is where production takes place. See Figure 2. For official FDI statistics to credit 
FDI from SFCE as a Chinese company to an ultimate investment destination, it would have to 
be officially undertaken by the Chinese-incorporated affiliate (Wuxi Suntech Power) and gone 
directly to the host destination. This was not found to be the case in any of SFCE’s investments. 
Rather FDI stemming from SFCE, or one of its entities, was without exception routed through 
a tax haven back to China or onward to a third country destination. These types of investments 
are not captured by official FDI, but using the methodological approach described above (i.e. 
using firm-level GUO data and understanding beneficial ownership of value-adding portions 
of the business where GUO data are difficult to obtain) it is possible to capture a valid picture 
of investment behavior by Chinese firms. Building from the above discussion, the question 
remains: how do the results of past empirical studies using official Chinese OFDI data change, 
if at all, when using alternative sources that account for the significant volumes of investments 
transited through offshore SPEs? 
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******* Figure 2 about here ******* 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To methodologically address our research question, it is vital to first understand the results of 
past studies which use official data to perform statistical analysis. After surveying the literature, 
we identified studies which: 1) explore Chinese OFDI; 2) use an official data source for the 
dependent variable; 3) use publicly accessible data for all variables; and 4) use a period of study 
starting in 2003, or after, as this is the timeframe available for our firm-level data which 
accounts for global ultimate ownership of Chinese investments. Studies which match these 
criteria are Kolstad and Wiig (2012), Cheng and Ma (2010), and Hurst (2011). Buckley et al. 
(2007) meet all of the above criteria aside from an outdated period of study. In light of the 
enormous influence of Buckley et al.’s (2007) study on Chinese OFDI research (nearly half of 
all citations in our sample of studies identified in Table 1), we elect to update the findings of 
Buckley et al. (2007) to 2003-2017 using the same variable measurements and data sources as 
the original study. Thus, we use four studies to explore how the results of past studies may 
have been confounded by the pervasive use of tax havens by CMNEs. We do this through 
replication methodology. More specifically, we first gathered the exact same variables 
specified in each study. We then employed the same econometric modeling methodology 
exactly as expressed in the original paper. After the original studies were successfully 
replicated, we make one – and only one – change to each model. The dependent variable from 
each study, which used official OFDI data, is replaced by a dependent variable which takes 
global ultimate ownership into account. Table 2 shows the relative geographic dispersion of 
Chinese OFDI broken down by official (MOFCOM) data and commercial (GUO) data by value 
of investments. As can be seen, the top destination countries for Chinese OFDI are drastically 
different for MOFCOM and GUO data. THOFCs are the main host economies reported in the 
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MOFCOM data. The opposite is true of GUO data – few prominent THOFCs are featured on 
the list of top 10 Chinese OFDI host economies.  
******* Table 2 about here ******* 
In many cases the replication models yielded slightly different results to those reported in each 
original study. The notable exception is Cheng and Ma (2010).1 We were able to replicate all 
of Cheng and Ma’s (2010) models exactly except one (which was a very close replication). 
Replication of Hurst (2011) and Kolstad and Wiig (2012) were less precise than Cheng and Ma 
(2010) but are still usable for the purposes of this study. Prior to replication, the data from 
Buckley et al. (2007) was first updated from 1984-2001 to 2003-2017 using the same variable 
measurements and data sources as the original study. 
All studies in our sample, and replications, used location choice modeling techniques. Cheng 
and Ma (2010) used a balanced panel data set for the period 2003-2006 to estimate a gravity 
equation of Chinese OFDI flows to between 90-98 host economies and OFDI stocks to between 
125-150 host economies (depending on the model), as reported by MOFCOM. Hurst (2011) 
used Chinese OFDI flows data from MOFCOM for the period 2003-2008. Their unbalanced 
panel data set is estimated using random effects generalized least squares models. OECD 
reported tax havens are excluded from their analysis.2 Kolstad & Wiig (2012) used UNCTAD 
data for their dependent variable of Chinese OFDI. Similar to Cheng & Ma (2010), they use a 
time period of 2003-2006. They note: ‘this data captures Chinese FDI more comprehensively 
than earlier studies such as Buckley et al. (2007) and Cheung and Qian (2008), which only 
captured approved flows’ (pp. 30). However, Kolstad & Wiig (2012) go on to exclude FDI to 
tax havens as ‘ultimate destinations of FDI flows are difficult to discern’ (pp. 28). While this 
                                                     
1 Professors Cheng and Ma were gracious enough to send us the exact data used in their study.  
2 The OECD list of tax havens does not include Hong Kong, but does include locations with large amounts of 
Chinese OFDI (according to official statistics) including, for example, the British Virgin Islands and Cayman 
Islands. 
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effectively takes out round tripping FDI, it also removes onward-journeying FDI, which is 
highly problematic. They estimate their models using OLS on cross-section, rather than panel, 
data. 
Finally, Buckley et al. (2007) used both pooled OLS and generalized least squares models to 
estimate the location choice of Chinese MNEs. They used project data from the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) for their dependent variable for the time period 
1984-2001. SAFE is under the direct supervision of MOFCOM and uses parallel methods for 
generating OFDI statistics. MOFCOM and two departments under its supervision, SAFE and 
National Bureau of Statistics, jointly release the statistical communique on China’s direct 
investment overseas (MOFCOM 2013). 
GUO dependent variable data 
As previously discussed, our global ultimate ownership dependent variable data are derived 
from commercial data bases. All mergers and acquisitions (M&A) data were drawn from the 
Thomson ONE Banker database. All greenfield data were drawn from the Financial Times fDi 
Markets database. Thomson ONE captures M&A deals of approximately $1,000,000 or more. 
It has a team dedicated to tracking and verifying M&A deals from the ‘announced’ stage all 
the way to the “completed” stage, including value of investment as well as disentangling 
complex issues such as ownership and deal structures. Data reported by FT fDi Markets 
captures greenfield data of approximately $500,000 or more. Similar to Thomson ONE, the 
global ultimate parental owner is generally reported for these firms. 
While much of the data is publicly available across dispersed company and news sources for 
both greenfield and M&A data, understanding corporate structures for reporting global ultimate 
ownership is tedious and time consuming. This is exacerbated in the case of Chinese firms due 
to their extensive use of Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, and other tax 
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havens as subsidiary headquarters for investments abroad. To understand global ultimate 
ownership patterns of investment, it is vital to take parent company headquarters, the 
geography of value-added activities, and the profit distribution among major stakeholders into 
account. 
RESULTS 
Original, replication, and “new” results are reported for every relevant model in all four studies. 
One exception to this is Cheng and Ma (2010) where original and replication results match 
exactly. In this case replication results are not reported. Original results refer to modeling 
results as reported in the original study. Replication results are reported when a perfect 
replication of the original study was not possible. New results refer to modeling results which 
replace official data dependent variables with those which take global ultimate ownership into 
account. New models are based on the independent variables used in replication models. 
Results for all models are reported in Appendixes A-L. 
Modeling results, unsurprisingly, do generally show that studies which use official data sources 
for the dependent variable differ considerably from our updated results which use GUO data. 
There are changes in both sign and significance level in the majority of variables. In the Cheng 
and Ma (2010) replications (Appendix A-C) all variables except one (common border) were 
found to be different in sign, significance, or both. In the Kolstad and Wiig (2012) replications, 
three of six variables in the first model (Appendix D), four of eight in the second model 
(Appendix E), two of eight in the third model (Appendix F) and four of eight in the fourth 
model (Appendix G) were found to differ in sign, significance or both. Replications of Hurst 
(2011) found the first model (Appendix H) to have six of 11 variables changing in sign, 
significance or both and the second model (Appendix I) reporting three of 11 variables 
changing. Buckley et al. (2007) replication results indicate nine of 13 variables in the first 
model (Appendix J), nine of 13 variables in the second model (Appendix K) and seven of 13 
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variables in the third model (Appendix L) differ in sign, significance or both. These results lend 
strong support to our general argument, namely that use of official FDI data seriously 
undermines the credibility of many Chinese OFDI studies. 
While knowing discrepancies in results due to the use of official FDI data rather than data 
which accounts for the GUO is important, it is of interest to understand where those 
discrepancies take place. We, therefore, evaluate the findings of replication results in an 
attempt to understand common threads among their findings. The main areas impacted by using 
official data rather than data which accounts for the use of THOFCs are: cultural proximity; 
geographic distance; and natural resource seeking. Replication and original results were far 
more similar for GDP and political risk variables than other independent variables. Replication 
and “new” results are summarized in Table 3. 
******* Table 3 about here ******* 
Cultural proximity  
A commonly used variable in our sample studies is cultural proximity. Cultural proximity is an 
interesting variable to consider as it is argued that CMNEs may be attracted to destinations 
with strong ethnic networks. This is due to considerations such as the ability to engage in 
information sharing and the enforcement of community sanctions, such as network-wide 
disengagement with firms which participate in unfavorable or opportunistic behavior (Kennedy 
2016; Rauch and Trindade 2002; Song 2011). 
We find modeling results for the cultural proximity variable changed in sign or significance 
when using ultimate global ownership data. The impact of data discrepancies is not, however, 
straight forward. While there was movement in sign, significance, or both in five of seven 
models, there was not strong cohesion in the nature of the changes. This is most likely due to 
the significantly different methods for measuring the cultural proximity variable across studies. 
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Proxies for the cultural proximity variable ranged from countries with Chinese as an official 
language (Cheng and Ma 2010) to the percentage of ethnic Chinese in a country’s general 
population (Hurst 2011) and a dummy variable where 1 represents greater than 1% of the 
country population is ethnically Chinese (Buckley et al. 2007). These proxies range from a 
very narrow number of countries (Cheng and Ma 2010) to a relatively large number of countries 
included in this variable (Buckley et al. 2007). Chinese is, for example, the official language 
of only four economies outside of mainland China: Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
The number of countries with ethnic Chinese populations greater than one-percent is 31. While 
measures such as GDP, inflation rate and distance are likely to be measured in qualitatively 
similar manners, the cultural proximity variables used in our sample studies are vastly different. 
The multiple measurements for this variable, therefore, makes it very difficult to assess the 
impact of official Chinese OFDI data versus global ultimate ownership data. 
With the above in mind, we attempt to disaggregate the cultural proximity modeling results of 
each individual study. Cheng and Ma (2010) find cultural proximity to be a highly significant 
driver in the investment location decision. Replication results accounting for GUO do not find 
cultural proximity to be significant in any model. Due to a significant amount of Chinese 
investments flowing to Hong Kong according to official data (i.e. MOFCOM), it is perhaps 
unsurprising that this variable becomes insignificant when accounting for global ultimate 
ownership. Genuine FDI flows (i.e. those which are not round-tripping or onward-journeying) 
from China to Hong Kong are overstated in official data and cause a bias in modeling results 
toward culturally similar economies. 
Buckley et al. (2007) group all countries with more than one percent of the population together 
as culturally similar to China. In this case, the cultural proximity of Hong Kong is weighted 
equally with the United States and 29 other economies. In the full sample (i.e. OECD and non-
OECD countries) the cultural proximity variable went from positive and insignificant to 
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positive and highly significant. In the OECD sample it went from positive and significant to 
negative and insignificant. In the non-OECD sample it went from negative and insignificant to 
positive and significant. These results indicate the use of official FDI data rather than data 
which accounts for GUO is highly disruptive to modeling results for the cultural proximity 
variable when it is broadly measured and defined. 
When using the proportion of ethnic Chinese to total population (Hurst, 2011), modeling results 
do not change in sign or significance when accounting for global ultimate ownership in FDI 
data. This indicates using a continuous variable may be an attractive alternative for measuring 
cultural proximity as it is more robust than dummy variables which group large (or small) 
segments of observations as equally culturally similar or dissimilar to China. This seems 
reasonable when the proportion of ethnic Chinese varies widely across countries: 
approximately 74% in Singapore, 24% in Malaysia, 14% in Thailand, 4% in Australia and 1% 
in the US (UNCTAD 2015). 
Geographic distance 
Gravity modeling theory suggests investment transaction costs (such as transportation and 
communication) increase as geographic distance increases (Berry et al. 2010). This indicates 
investment will generally maintain a negative and significant relationship with FDI, which has 
been found in many earlier location choice studies looking at a wide variety of target/host 
country combinations. In our sample studies, the distance variable, which was measured 
similarly across sample studies, tended to change from negative to positive when accounting 
for global ultimate ownership. This was especially true for disaggregated samples (i.e. not fully 
specified samples). This finding indicates the impact of geographic distance on Chinese OFDI 
may be contrary to that commonly assumed for most MNEs. As the geographic distance 
between China and the host country increases, investments also increase. A significant amount 
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of Chinese investments picked up by official data in places such as Hong Kong may, therefore, 
be subsequently invested in geographically distant third countries.  
This is of interest, as considerable anecdotal discussion has highlighted the tendency of 
CMNEs to undertake aggressive strategic asset seeking strategies (Anderson et al. 2015; 
Anderson and Sutherland 2015a; Elia and Santangelo 2017; Sutherland et al. 2017; Zheng et 
al. 2016). These are typically undertaken  in developed markets, such as the US and Europe, 
which are geographically distant (Child and Rodrigues 2005; Deng 2009). In many cases, 
foreign direct investment laws and preferences are biased against Chinese companies (Sauvant 
2009). This, in turn, propagates the use of THOFCs as intermediate investment destinations to, 
in some cases, reduce investment scrutiny. 
How may the exclusion of round-tripping FDI and inclusion of onward-journeying FDI impact 
modeling results? The relative volume of FDI being routed through other prominent THOFCs, 
such as British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands, has diminished to a certain degree over the 
past decade while the prominence of FDI to Hong Kong has increased according to official 
statistics (see Table 2). The sheer volume of FDI reported going to Hong Kong by official FDI 
statistics compilers, therefore, may again be the primary culprit for confounding past results. 
Due to round-tripping considerations, when taking GUO into account, the volume of FDI to 
geographically near host economies is likely to diminish. Due to onward-journeying FDI routed 
through Hong Kong the volume of investments going to geographically distant economies will 
likely increase. Thus, accounting for changes to the investment patterns when measuring 
genuine (i.e. value-added) FDI to Hong Kong it is logical that the impact of geographic distance 
generally turned from negative to positive. These findings are collaborated by past studies in 
the areas of, for example, Financial and Economic Geography (Buckley et al. 2015; Haberly 
and Wójcik 2015b, 2015a), China Studies (Sutherland and Anderson 2015; Vlcek 2010; 
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Wójcik and Camilleri 2015) and International Business (Beugelsdijk et al. 2010; Sutherland et 
al. 2019).  
Natural resource endowments 
Relative natural resource scarcity in China has driven many, primarily state-owned, CMNEs 
to engage in aggressive natural resource source-seeking FDI. Many, although not all (see 
Anderson and Sutherland (2015) for an example), of these investments have taken place in 
economies which are less developed than China such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2009) and Latin America (Ludeña 2012). Following large natural resource investments 
by state-owned CMNEs into less-developed economies, many private CMNEs have co-located 
in order to offer necessary subsistent production activities as well as other manufacturing 
retailing services (Sanfilippo 2010). Much of the FDI from China into less-developed countries 
is directly or indirectly encouraged by central government officials: there are ‘a range of 
different incentives which encourage investment in Africa by Chinese firms. For example, 
companies investing in Africa gain access to prioritized credit at lower interest rates as well as 
tax incentives and other benefits’ (Whalley and Weisbrod 2012, p. 10). From a theoretical 
standpoint, therefore, Chinese MNEs have limited incentive to use THOFCs as a conduit for 
natural resource-seeking investments. 
The nature of investments in natural resource extraction projects, in the case of CMNEs, is 
generally handled on a government-to-government basis (Anderson and Sutherland 2015b; Luo 
et al. 2010). This greatly diminishes the likelihood of using SPEs to facilitate investments. That 
said, even though the natural resource endowment variable was measured in roughly similar 
manners across sample studies, in no case did any model which takes global ultimate ownership 
into account find significant modeling results for the natural resource variable. While there is 
little doubt CMNEs go abroad to secure natural resources, the intensity of natural resource 
seeking-behavior by CMNEs may be overstated relative to other investment initiatives. The 
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importance of various other drivers or deterrents to investment may have been masked by the 
large FDI flows to tax havens in official data. In other words, the proportion of FDI flowing 
from China to countries with large amounts of natural resources is inherently different when 
taking account for global ultimate ownership. The amount of FDI flowing to countries which 
are well-endowed with natural resources remained the same (there is little evidence natural 
resource-related investments are routed through tax havens), but the amount of Chinese FDI 
flowing from tax havens to countries which do not register high levels of natural resources 
(such as Europe) are understated in official data.  
GDP and political Risk 
GDP is often included as a proxy for market size and can thus be interpreted as a proxy for 
market seeking motives (i.e. MNEs are attracted to larger markets in which to sell their products 
or services). It is generally found to be positive and significant in empirical studies, especially 
when tax havens are excluded from modeling estimations. When ultimate global ownership is 
taken into account, theory suggests high levels of GDP are generally a driver for investment. 
The impact of political risk on Chinese FDI is a topical question. In most cases our sample 
studies find this variable to be positive, but insignificant. This indicates that Chinese FDI is 
drawn to politically risky destinations, but not significantly so. This finding is considered 
unusual, as most MNEs avoid political risk (Alon et al. 2014). As mentioned, tax havens by 
definition enjoy strong institutions and low political risk. The political risk of Hong Kong, for 
example, has been among the lowest in the world. Further, much of the literature argues 
CMNEs engage in politically risky environments primarily to obtain natural resources (Quer 
et al. 2012). As previously discussed, THOFC are unlikely to be significantly impacted by 
geographic dispersion and volume biases due to natural resource-seeking FDI. 
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In line with theoretical predictions, the use of official data does not seem to have a large impact 
on GDP and political risk variables. The modeling results for the GDP variable did not change 
in sign or significance when using GUO data. In no case did the sign (positive) change for this 
variable. Further, in the vast majority of cases the significance level remained the same across 
replication and new results. Modeling results for the political risk variable also did not change 
in sign or significance when using ultimate global ownership data. In the majority of cases, 
neither sign nor significance levels changed with the introduction of the dependent variable 
which takes global ultimate ownership into account.  
DISCUSSION 
The primary goal of this research was to propose a methodologically appropriate approach for 
testing the determinants of Chinese OFDI and subsequently understand how the use of official 
data in past studies may have confounded understanding of CMNE behaviors. Through the 
replication of several studies, we found high levels of discrepancies in general sign and 
significance between our modeling results and those using officially recorded FDI data. More 
specifically, the main areas impacted by using official data rather than data which accounts for 
the use of THOFCs are: cultural proximity; geographic distance; and natural resource seeking. 
The use of official data, however, does not seem to have a large impact on the modeling results 
for GDP and political risk variables. 
Many of the studies exploring Chinese OFDI, published in International Business, Strategy, 
Management and Economics journals, fail to account for the highly nuanced nature of 
conducting business in and from China. This failure has led to the misuse of official FDI 
statistics and subsequent misleading results and conclusions. Popular discourse surrounding 
the determinants of Chinese OFDI is increasingly being shaped by methodologically 
questionable results. The four papers replicated in this study, for example, have over 3,600 
citations alone. It is vital to understand the important nuances of using China and Chinese 
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companies as a focal point for academic work. Our first goal was to elucidate methodologically 
sound prescriptions for measuring CMNE OFDI activity. Our findings help disentangle the 
impact of the complexity of China’s home institutional context and how this may warrant 
change in methodological assumptions when performing econometric analysis.  
The results of our replication work raise important questions regarding the validity of the 
conclusions of past studies. More specifically, our results spur discussion on the biases created 
by using official FDI data in econometric modeling. The highly influential nature of the studies 
on CMNEs which use official FDI data may, for example, have unintentionally misled 
subsequent theoretical studies to call for new theories or extension to existing theories to 
account for the behavior of CMNEs as many of the calls for new theorization are resting on a 
tenuous foundation involving methodologically flawed results. Our results, in addition, draw 
attention to the need for further research on the problems associated with studies that use firm-
level data to explore CMNE activity. This is because many such studies suffer from a somewhat 
similar problem to those that use officially collected data. This is to say, more often than not, 
they fail to adequately distinguish between SPE-related subsidiary investments and genuine 
FDI projects (Sutherland et al. 2019). Indeed, as noted earlier, it has been shown that most of 
the studies over the past decade published in the Academy of International Business’s flagship 
journal, Journal of International Business Studies, have made this kind of error. This testifies 
to the pervasive complacency in the International Business academic literature which 
empirically investigates MNEs and their international investment strategies. 
Broader implications of our findings 
We have looked at studies which use official FDI data to understand CMNE behavior. It is 
important to note, however, that there are many hundreds, if not thousands, of studies that use 
other national level FDI data to draw similar types of inferences about MNE activity. In this 
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sense, our critical evaluation of CMNE work holds a much broader and, arguably, more 
important question: how reliable, in general, are studies which use officially recorded FDI data? 
Official FDI data is collected according to agreed international guidelines set by influential 
organizations such as the OECD, World Bank, and IMF. While the country-level institutions 
in China may exacerbate the use of tax havens, and thus introduce data biases in official 
Chinese OFDI statistics, the Chinese case is by no means unique. Most national level data 
suffers from identical collection problems. Interestingly, the OECD is well aware of and have 
acknowledged these deficiencies for some time now. In particular, the problem of FDI that 
transits between several countries (capital in transit), inflates FDI to the first port of call and 
underestimates that to the second, has been recognized. Such is the perceived scale of the 
problem today that the OECD has recently gone so far as to amend its guidelines for collecting 
FDI data (OECD 2015). It has advised that the reporting of SPE related investments should 
now be reported separate from non-SPE related (i.e. genuine) FDI. The drive by the OECD to 
more accurately capture SPE related investments reflects their desire to not only improve the 
reporting system so that it accurately captures MNE activity, but also so that appropriate ways 
of taxing MNEs can be developed. 
While only a small number of countries have yet adopted the new OECD reporting 
requirements, disaggregated reporting of SPE and non-SPE related FDI has already produced 
some very provocative results. It allows for a disaggregation of FDI by immediate and ultimate 
investing country. For example, the largest investor in France is the United States according to 
global ultimate ownership measures. By immediate investing country, however, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg are by far the most important sources of FDI into France. This 
is because US MNEs commonly transit capital through the Netherlands and Luxembourg for 
subsequent investment in France, which affords them certain benefits, including the potential 
for tax rate reductions (OECD 2015).  
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CMNE use of SPEs may be pervasive, thus limiting the usefulness of official FDI statistics, 
but the problem is not unique to Chinese firms. The specific home institutional context of 
CMNEs has, however, inflamed the seriousness of this issue. This finding adds further 
legitimacy to the importance of the institutional perspective as a productive lens for 
understanding emerging market MNEs generally and CMNEs specifically (Sutherland, 
Anderson, Bailey, et al. 2020). Official data from other countries may have uniquely serious 
methodological concerns relating to their specific contexts. Further research is necessary to 
understand the degree to which this is so. 
CONCLUSION 
The volume of Chinese OFDI has undoubtedly grown enormously over the last decade. 
Particular caution, however, must be exercised when employing official FDI data to evaluate 
the cross-border investment behavior of CMNEs. This is because early in China’s economic 
reforms preferential tax rates for foreign businesses created strong incentives for Chinese 
businesses to become “foreign” MNEs. Chinese businesses responded to these incentives by 
creating offshore holding companies. These offshore structures provided convenient vehicles 
for the round-tripping of capital back to China. Even with the introduction of the new Enterprise 
Income Tax Law in 2008, which has harmonized tax rates for foreign and domestic businesses, 
the tendency towards offshore incorporation remains strong. This is because offshore 
companies allow Chinese businesses access to international capital markets, to circumvent 
domestic regulations, undertake property rights transactions (i.e. institutional arbitrage) and, 
potentially, lower their tax rates. 
The tendency for CMNEs to establish offshore holding companies in THOFCs has given rise 
to significant biases in official FDI statistics, as well also as confounding many studies that use 
firm-level data. Using global ultimate ownership data, we have put forward an alternate 
approach to measure genuine CMNE OFDI activity, one which confronts and deals with their 
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pervasive engagement with tax havens. Through the replication of several Chinese OFDI 
location choice studies, moreover, we were able to understand how methodological issues 
stemming from the use of official FDI data may influence prior econometric results. In doing 
so we hope to have sparked a debate which may lead to a re-evaluation of earlier received 
wisdom regarding CMNE investment strategy and behaviors. This in turn should foster 
improved theorizing regarding the Chinese multinational enterprise and its outward investment 
activities. In addition, it is vital that other disciplines, particularly studies published within the 
field of economics, become far more cognizant of the serious problems associated with using 
FDI data to measure MNE activity.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: A sample of 13 statistical studies which use official FDI data sources to explore CMNE 
FDI behavior. 




Buckley et al. (2007) SAFE3 2603 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) UNCTAD 788 
Cheung and Qian (2009) MOFCOM 502 
Cui and Jiang (2012) MOFCOM  504 
Kang and Jiang (2012) MOFCOM 349 
Liu, Buck, and Shu (2005) MOFCOM/UNCTAD 292 
Zhang and Daly (2011) MOFCOM 219 
Cheng and Ma (2007)  MOFCOM 166 
Cheng and Ma (2010) MOFCOM 156 
Huang and Wang (2011) MOFCOM 117 
Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013) MOFCOM 83 
Hurst (2011) MOFCOM 64 
Chang (2014) MOFCOM 51 
Armstrong (2011) MOFCOM/OECD 22 
Zhang and Roelfsema (2014) MOFCOM 18 
Total 5934 
* Google Scholar citations as of May 27, 2020 
 
                                                     
3 State Administration of Foreign Exchange, or SAFE, is under the direct supervision of MOFCOM 
Table 2: Geographic dispersion of Chinese OFDI broken down by official (MOFCOM) and 
commercial (GUO) datasets by value of investments for years 2005, 2010, and 2015. 
 
Year 2005 
GUO data MOFCOM data 
Rank Country % of total Rank Country % of total 
1 Canada 29% 1 Cayman Is 42% 
2 Indonesia 22% 2 Hong Kong 28% 
3 Russia 10% 3 British Virgin Is 10% 
4 South Korea 4% 4 Korea South 5% 
5 Philippines 3% 5 United States 2% 
6 Mongolia 3% 6 Russia 2% 
7 India 3% 7 Australia 2% 
8 Egypt 3% 8 Germany 1% 
9 Pakistan 2% 9 Kazakhstan 1% 
10 Angola 2% 10 Sudan 1% 
 
Year 2010 
GUO data MOFCOM data 
Rank Country % of total Rank Country % of total 
1 Brazil 17% 1 Hong Kong 56% 
2 Australia 9% 2 British Virgin Is 9% 
3 United States 8% 3 Cayman Is 5% 
4 Hong Kong 7% 4 Luxembourg 5% 
5 Canada 7% 5 Australia 2% 
6 Argentina 6% 6 Sweden 2% 
7 Russia 6% 7 United States 2% 
8 Indonesia 5% 8 Canada 2% 
9 India 4% 9 Singapore 2% 
10 Sweden 3% 10 Myanmar 1% 
 
Year 2015 
GUO data MOFCOM data 
Rank Country % of total Rank Country % of total 
1 India 12% 1 Hong Kong 41% 
2 Indonesia 11% 2 Netherlands 6% 
3 United States 8% 3 Singapore 5% 
4 Pakistan 7% 4 Cayman Is 5% 
5 Hong Kong 6% 5 Eritrea 4% 
6 Australia 6% 6 Trinidad and Tobago 4% 
7 Malaysia 4% 7 Sierra Leone 4% 
8 United Kingdom 4% 8 United States 4% 
9 Netherlands 4% 9 Serbia 3% 
10 South Korea 3% 10 Chile 3% 
 
Table 3: Replication and new modelling results summary. Full model or main model specification reported. 



























+*** +*** -ns -** +*** +ns     
Kolstad and 
Wiig (2012) 
+*** +*** +ns -ns   +** +ns +ns +ns 
Hurst (2011) 
– OECD only 
+*** +*** -ns +ns +*** +*** +* -ns +* +*** 
Buckley et al. 
(2007) 
+*** +*** +ns -** +ns +*** +*** +ns -ns -ns 
Notes: + = positive; - = negative; * = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at 1% level; ns = not significant 




Figure 2: Suntech Power Holding Co.’s Organizational Structure, 2010
 
Source: Suntech (2010) 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix A: Cheng and Ma (2010) full sample results comparison 
2003-2006 
Original – full 
sample 
New – full 
sample 




























R2  0.3087 0.262 
No. of observations 392 330 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
 
Appendix B: Cheng and Ma (2010) tax haven economies (OECD list) excluded results 
comparison 
2003-2006 
Original – full 
sample 






























R2  0.3212 0.262 
No. of observations 375 313 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
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Appendix C: Cheng and Ma (2010) offshore financial center economies (IMF list) excluded 
results comparison 
2003-2006 











































R2  0.2364 0.2377 0.2679 
No. of observations 362 362 301 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
 
























































Obs 104 97 105 
R-sq 0.236 0.4561 0.1546 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
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Obs 104 97 105 
R-sq 0.236 0.4791 0.2155 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
 































































Obs 25 24 24 
R-sq 0.388 0.6386 0.3153 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
  
 5 
































































Obs 79 73 81 
R-sq 0.261 0.3001 0.3444 
























































































Observations 56 76 59 
R2 (%) 84.44 44.14 69.73 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
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Observations 92 107 99 
R2 (%) 40.42 41.52 24.81 




Appendix J: Buckley et al. (2007) updated (2003-2017) generalized least squares (GLS) 
model results comparison 
2003-2017 
Original – Full 
sample (GLS) 
Updated replication 
– Full sample (GLS) 
















































































N 402 602 559 
Adj. R2 0.6019 0.15992 0.25461 




Appendix K: Buckley et al. (2007) updated (2003-2017) OECD generalized least squares 




















































































N 198 113 99 
Adj. R2 0.5763 0.42164 0.2706 




Appendix L: Buckley et al. (2007) updated (2003-2017) non-OECD generalized least squares 




















































































N 204 507 460 
Adj. R2 0.6737 0.15317 0.21596 
***=.01; **=.05; *=.1 significance levels. Standard error in parentheses. 
 
